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FOREWORD
Foreword
In the post-BEPS tax transparency era, with Country-by-Country Reporting, reinfor-
ced international tax standards and a boost in enforcement by tax administrations in
developed and developing countries, large business need to be in control of tax risks,
which encompass not only the traditional financial risks of taxes, interest and fines
but also, and perhaps more importantly, reputational risks.
In this scenario, tax has become a strategic issue and the board of directors is ulti-
mately responsible for tax risk assurance to shareholders and stakeholders. For this
purpose, corporations need a strategy approved at board level and implemented
through well-designed and effective tax control frameworks, normally in the broader
context of corporate governance frameworks.
This handbook builds on the relevant international standards and best practice to
provide guidance for setting out the pillars of a tax control framework and mitigate
tax risks of large, complex taxpayers. It discusses the relationship between tax and
corporate governance and addresses the key elements of a corporate tax strategy.
The pillars of the leading tax control frameworks are also analyzed, including the
allocation of responsibilities, appetite for risk, tax risks governance and risk assu-
rance.
The most significant tax risks are examined under the perspective of the post-BEPS
environment, with specific attention to headline risks such as transfer pricing, per-
manent establishment, aggressive financial planning and jurisdictional risks.
The handbook also examines how taxpayers can gain certainty and hedge tax risks by
leveraging on services provided by tax administrations, including rulings, domestic
and international cooperative compliance and dispute resolution mechanisms.
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Disclaimer
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institutions they are affiliated
with.
The handbook is a conceptual exercise and does not generally contain references to
domestic legal frameworks. It is a bona fide exercise intended to support corporate
executives, but in no way can it be regarded as legal advice.
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ChapTeR 1 
INTRODUCTION
This book is about tax assurance. In other words, it deals with the need, legally or 
otherwise established, to provide confidence to shareholders and stakeholders about 
the correctness of the tax positions taken by the business.
The term “assurance”, borrowed from financial auditing, describes the outcome of 
an audit process whereby the trust of the user of the report in its underlying object 
is enhanced1. Since taxes, especially CIT, are part of financial accounts, any financial 
audit is also a tax assurance exercise. However, the concept of tax assurance has a 
broader scope, as it encompasses profit taxes but also indirect, payroll or property 
tax, third-party information returns and any other tax obligation. for MNEs, it also 
involves dealing with tax administrations in numerous and diverse jurisdictions. 
Looking at tax assurance as a separate element of corporate governance is a recent 
phenomenon2 that is gradually attracting interest from business schools3, scholars, 
practitioners and public authorities worldwide. It emerged in the early 2000s propelled 
by the spread of corporate governance frameworks and developments in company 
law4, and gained prominence with the offer of cooperative compliance arrangements 
in OECD countries further to the enhanced relationship concept, born in 20085. Repu-
tational concerns and the need to balance the interests of a diverse range of internal 
and external stakeholders have boosted the demand for tax assurance. 
This book draws on existing research and guidance to present a practical view of how 
a tax control framework can be planned, implemented, assessed and monitored. It 
could have focused on tax compliance, or on tax risks management, but I chose Tax 
Assurance because it has a broader meaning and purpose. Tax Compliance is, in my 
view, narrower than Tax assurance because it only deals with meeting all the substan-
tive and procedural fiscal obligations. Tax Risk Management is a bit broader than Tax 
compliance, since it includes strategic decisions on how tax laws will be interpreted 
and applied to the business; however, it does not cover the layer of trustworthiness 
that is implied in Tax Assurance. 
The current demand for tax assurance responds to CSR codes, regulatory bodies (es-
pecially, cooperative compliance arrangements) and society at large, which is increas-
ingly attaching value to transparency in business and public affairs. It also reflects a 
gradual shift in businesses´ priorities: over the last decade, the focus of corporate tax 
executives has moved away from achieving a low ETR to keeping tax risks in control6. 
1  Ronald Russo: Tax Assurance: Nexiology in Taxation? Tilburg University. 2016. Pg. 4. Available at https://
pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/13409933/160604_R.Russo_oratie_.pdf 
2  Haroldene f. Wunder: Tax Risk Management and the Multinational Enterprise. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 18 (1), 2009. Pg. 15. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S1061951808000475 
3  A Masters´ Programme on Tax Assurance was inaugurated in Tilburg University, the Netherlands, in 
2008. See Russo, note 1 supra.
4  Especially relevant was Section 404 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This provision requires 
public companies to issue, as part of their annual financial reports, an internal control report which 
shall state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting, as well as an assessment of the effective-
ness of the internal control structure and procedures. In addition, it mandates that external auditors 
preparing or issuing the audit report attest to the assessment made by management. (107th Congress 
of the USA: An act to protect investors, by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures 
made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Avail-
able at https://www.iasplus.com/en/othernews/united-states/sarbanes-oxley-acst-of-2002).
5  In the OECD report about tax intermediaries (OECD: Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries, 2008. 
Available at www.oecd.org/tax/administration/39882938.pdf).
6  In 1998, Arlinghaus surveyed tax managers of the fortune 500 companies and found that tax risk 
and tax risk management were not even among their goals, which in turn included managing ETR 
worldwide. (Arlinghaus Barry P.: Goal Setting and Performance Measures by tax professionals in For-
tune 500 companies. The Tax Executive, 50(6), 434-442, 1998, available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/
Page?handle=hein.journals/taxexe50&div=143&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals). In 2005, 
Cummings confirmed that, as recently as the late 1990s, the primary focus of the tax function was 
management of the corporation´s ETR (see Wunder, 2009, note 2 supra). In contrast, in 2016 the Aus-
tralian Board of Taxation concluded that there is evidence that the appetite for tax risk has declined 
over the last decade (Australian Board of Taxes: A tax Transparency Code, A report to the Treasurer. 
Available at https://data.gov.au/dataset/voluntary-tax-transparency-code, 2016. Pg. 12).
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The financial and reputational consequences of tax risks have increased significantly7 
and so appetite for tax risk has declined, to the extent that keeping risks in control is 
the top priority for today’s tax leaders, and the tax department’s contribution to stra-
tegic value now seems to take priority over cost minimization in many areas8. 
Contributing factors are the OECD-G20 BEPS Project9, the EU anti-avoidance pack-
age reinforced by the State Aid doctrine and the emergence of stakeholders that have 
transformed tax avoidance from a technical issue into a political one. Tax activism by 
NGOs and, more recently, revelations by the ICIJ, leveraging on the power of social 
networks, have turned tax risk, which used to be primarily financial, into a reputa-
tional one. 
In this new scenario, this handbook aims to:
Table 1 Objectives of this handbook
•   Gain greater insight into the concept of tax assurance by private and public sec-
tor executives, 
•   Assist  boards  in  their  duty  of  keeping  tax  risks  in  control  through  effective 
TCfs,
•   Provide practical orientations for the identification, assessment, rating and miti-
gation of tax risks,
•   Advance the quest for international tax good governance standards10,
•   Raise  awareness  among  the  business  community  about  cooperative  compli-
ance,
•   Assist revenue bodies adjust their tax risk management strategies by leveraging 
on justified trust provided by TCfs; and
•   Facilitate the review of tax control frameworks by tax administrations as part of 
their risk assessment protocols11.
When Boards and CEOs communicate the priorities of their corporate tax strategy, the 
possibilities basically rank from create value for the shareholder on one hand (meaning 
save cash in taxes) and pay the legal amount of tax on the other. If your corporate tax 
strategy is “no surprises”, this handbook is for you. 
Primarily written for large multinationals of any business sector, it is also valid for 
domestic and smaller organizations. A critical assumption is that there is not a one-
size-fits-all model, and companies will need to consider their circumstances. Another 
critical assumption is that tax risk is just another risk affecting corporations. Tax risk 
will be, therefore, encapsulated in the broader context of corporate risk management. 
A third critical assumption is that a top-down approach is required. It is not possible 
to implement a TCf if senior executives and company directors are not committed to 
it. 
7  The 13-billion bill that the EU Commission asked Ireland to recover in a State Aid case in 2016 is 
allegedly the highest tax liability in history, although technically it is not a tax assessment but the 
recovery of state aid. (EU: State aid: Commission refers Ireland to Court for failure to recover illegal tax 
benefits from Apple worth up to €13 billion. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
3702_en.htm, 2017).
8  KPMG: A look inside tax departments worldwide and how they are evolving. Global Tax Benchmarking. 
Available at https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/05/tax-benchmarking-report.
pdf 2018, Pg. 2.
9  “As a result of BEPS, it has become even more crucial for multinational enterprises to be in control of tax 
risks today” (OCDE: Co-operative Tax Compliance, Building Better Tax Control Frameworks. ISBN 978-92-
64-25398-8. 2016, pg. 12).
10  Tax good governance standards are currently undefined. As a Dutch think-tank has put it, “it would be 
very beneficial if all stakeholders come together to develop a standard that provides consistent reporting 
requirements across the globe” (Rudy Verstappen, Tjierd van der Berg and Hifsa Yonus: Tax Transpar-
ency Benchmark 2017, A comparative study of 76 listed Dutch companies. VBDO and PWC. November 
2017. Available at https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-tax-transparency-benchmark-2017.
pdf, Pg. 13). 
11  The best practice in this field is currently being applied by Australia´s ATO (see Chapter 11 below).
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Risk taking is the essence of entrepreneurship and there is no such thing as business 
without risk because risk is the ultimate driver of returns on investment. This subject 
is therefore at the heart of the organization: risk-taking, whether private, public or 
third sector, whether large or small, is what managing an organization is about12. 
Tax risk management ensures that tax risks are identified, monitored, reported and 
mitigated as appropriate, but... what is tax risk? 
I. Definition
Tax risk is the possibility that companies may be paying or accounting for an incor-
rect amount of tax, or that the tax positions a company adopts are out of step with the 
tax risk appetite that the directors have authorized or believe is prudent13. Tax risk is 
primarily financial (the possibility of additional assessments, interest and penalties on 
one hand, or excessive payments if the company has made errors or has not applied 
tax benefits it was entitled to, on the other), but it also has a reputational dimension: 
the likelihood that actions emanating from the tax function will subject the company 
to adverse publicity and erode goodwill, consumer´s trust and brand equity.
Tax risk may also be regarded as the potential that a chosen action or activity, or the 
failure to take action or pursue an activity, will lead to a tax outcome that is different 
from what was initially expected14. This can happen due to a variety of uncertainties15, 
for example, changes in the law, the judicial process, changes in business assump-
tions, an increased intensity of audits and uncertainty in the interpretation of the law. 
In turn, the sources of uncertainties may be classified in two: economic and regula-
tory. The economic component arises from the decisions, actions or inactions by busi-
nesses that result in anticipated tax outcomes. The regulatory component arises from 
the decisions, actions or inactions by tax authorities16.
In principle, a company can only manage the economic sources of uncertainty, that is 
to say: the business decisions that will aggravate or mitigate the risks. We shouldn´t 
forget, however, that in modern tax administrations businesses can also influence 
their regulatory risk environment by taking actions that will affect their risk ratings 
by tax authorities, such as signing APAs or entering into cooperative compliance ar-
rangements, thus reducing uncertainty on the regulatory front as well17. 
Looking now only at economic risks, the uncertainties of a company may spring out 
of three causes18:
12  Institute of Risk Management: Risk appetite and tolerance to risk. Available at https://www.theirm.org/
knowledge-and-resources/thought-leadership/risk-appetite-and-tolerance.aspx, 2011. 
13  ATO: Tax Risk Management and Governance Review Guide. Available at https://www.ato.gov.au/Busi-
ness/Large-business/In-detail/Key-products-and-resources/Tax-risk-management-and-govern-
ance-review-guide/, Pg. 1. 
14  Neuman, S., Omer, T. and Schmidt, A.: Risk and Return: Does Tax Risk Reduce Firms’ Effective Tax Rates? 
American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting: Research-In-Process. Available at https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/256046673_Risk_and_Return_Does_Tax_Risk_Reduce_firms%27_Ef-
fective_Tax_Rates, 2013.
15  There is a distinction to make between risk and uncertainty, because business embraces risks, but steer 
clear of uncertainties. Risk is an unknown outcome with well-defined possibilities, while uncertainty is 
an unknown outcome with unknown possibilities. (One Source, Thomson Reuters. The Shifting Land-
scape of Direct Tax and the Right Framework to Address it. http://ebook-market.com/thomsonreuters1/
DT_2_Whitepaper.pdf. 2015. Pg. 2.)
16  Arlinghaus, note 6 supra. 
17  See Cooperative Compliance under chapter 13.III below
18  Tony Elgood, Ian Paroissien and Larry Quimby: Tax Risk Management. PWC, 2004. Available at https://
www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax-management-strategy/pdf/tax-risk-management-guide.pdf 
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•   Uncertainty as to the application of the law and practice to particular facts.
•   Uncertainty over the facts themselves: whether they are true or whether they are 
relevant.
•   Uncertainty as to how well company systems operate to arrive at the tax results of 
the business activities and operations. 
Managing tax risks is therefore understanding where these uncertainties may arise, 
making judgements about their potential consequences and deciding a course of ac-
tion to retain or mitigate the risk. Consequently, the effectiveness of a risk manage-
ment system will depend to a large extent on the quality of these judgements. This is 
precisely the core of a tax risk framework: establishing a proper process for making 
judgements in response to tax uncertainties. 
In effect, there are three basic areas of tax that can be managed and controlled. These 
are: 
•   The tax charge,
•   Tax risk,
•   The cost of running and managing the tax affairs of the group19
from this perspective, a company´s policy on tax risk management is a trade-off 
between the value that can be achieved by taking risks (e.g. cash savings derived of 
tax avoidance structures), the costs that may be implied if undesired events happen 
(tax charges, penalties, interests, civil or criminal procedures and often reputational 
damages), and the resources needed to properly manage all this. We will examine the 
tradeoff between risk and reward under “appetite for risk” in 6.2.2 below.
II. an emerging view of tax risk
Owing to changes in Corporate Governance-related legislation20, new business mod-
els, technology and an increased awareness of corporate tax avoidance after the radi-
cal transformation of tax policy and tax administration worldwide caused by the BEPS 
project, as outlined in chapter 3, a new view of tax risk is emerging21. 
Table 2 an emerging view of tax risk
Traditional emerging
financial risk (overpayments, under-
benefits, penalties, indirect costs of han-
dling enquiries). 
financial + Reputational risk
focus on ETR focus on compliance and risk minimiza-
tion
focus on CIT Holistic view, including “under the line” 
taxes (CIT) and “above the line”: VAT, oth-
er indirect taxes, local taxes, information 
returns, etc.
Ancillary function Strategic importance
Stand-alone Integrated in ERM frameworks
Domestic Global 
19  Ibídem. Pg. 18.
20  Such as SOX in the US, note 4 supra.
21  Deloitte: Risk transformation and Tax. Securing the benefits of enhanced tax-risk management, 2015. 
Available at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Tax/2015-deloitte-ire-
land-risk-transformation-and-tax-deloitte-ireland.pdf 
© francis Lefebvre  TaX RISK 21
III. Frameworks 
In the context of the ever-increasing complexity of business, keeping risks in control 
requires a robust framework22. A framework encompasses culture, capabilities and 
practices that organizations apply when they carry out their strategy with the purpose 
of managing risk in creating, preserving and realizing value23. A Tax Control frame-
work (TCf) is the part of the internal control that assures the accuracy and complete-
ness of the tax returns and disclosures made by an enterprise24. 
Having a TCf is important for all stakeholders, but it has a particular significance for 
revenue bodies because it is central to taxpayers opting into cooperative compliance 
programs. A TCf generates justified trust, and when revenue authorities perform ob-
jective assessments of taxpayers’ TCfs, they may obtain empirical evidence that the 
business is willing and able to provide the disclosure and transparency needed to 
base the relationship on mutual trust. 
Given the consequences attached to having sound TCfs, it might be expected that 
legislatures have provided minimum requirements, but no country has, so far, pub-
lished legislation to that effect25. In its absence, regard must be given to COSO´s En-
terprise Risk Management26 (ERM), the de facto global standard for internal controls27, 
although it must be noted that COSO is not tax-specific. 
In the search of a framework specifically conceived for tax purposes, a breakthrough 
was the work of Elgood, Paroissien and Quimby, who in 2004 published Tax Risk Man-
agement (TRM)28, a comprehensive guide to handle tax risks that is still the basic 
reference in this area. Elgood, Paroissien and Quimby´s TRM framework is based on 
COSO-ERM29 but replacing COSO´s business objectives with seven types of tax risk 
identified and described therein. COSO’s ERM and TRM are both influenced by com-
pany law, and this is reflected in their focus on shareholders and stakeholders. 
Coming from a different angle, in 2016 the OECD published a framework focused on 
tax assurance for revenue bodies: Co-operative Tax Compliance: Building Better Tax 
Control Frameworks (BBTCf)30. It was the culmination of a process that had started in 
2003 when the Australian Taxation Office launched its Tax in the Boardroom campaign, 
the first attempt at establishing what would later become the enhanced relationship 
and is currently known as co-operative compliance. 
The tax risk framework published by the OECD in 2016 builds on earlier works, notably 
Good Corporate Governance, the Tax Dimension31, which explored the link between tax 
and Corporate Governance, resulting in the need for the board to ensure that tax does 
not encourage behavior that is contrary to the long-term interests of the company, 
to protect transparency and to ensure the quality of decisions in the tax area. It also 
builds on the 2008 fTA’s Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries32, which proposed the 
“enhanced relationship”, an innovative way of engaging taxpayers that a few years 
22  A framework is defined as “a basic conceptual structure to facilitate a common understanding among 
experts in a field“ (the Merriam-Webster Dictionary).
23  COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission): Enterprise Risk Man-
agement, Integrating with Strategy and Performance. Executive Summary. Available at https://www.coso.
org/Pages/ERM-framework-Purchase.aspx, 2017.
24  OECD: Co-operative Compliance: A Framework. From Enhanced Relationship to Co-operative Compliance. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/co-operative-compliance-a-framework-9789264200852-en.htm, 
2013, pg. 58. 
25  This is partly owed to the difficulty of finding commonality, as TCf tend to be firm-specific, and partly 
due to reluctance from authorities, as in the Netherlands, to prevent that issuing regulation might 
lead to a “tick the box” behaviour. See Russo, note 1 supra, Pgs. 9-10.
26  COSO published in 1992 Internal Control, an Integrated Framework, then updated it in 2003 with En-
terprise Risk Management Framework and more recently, in 2017, with Enterprise Risk Management, 
Integrating with Strategy and Performance. (note 23 supra)
27  Wunder, note 2 supra, pg. 16.
28  PWC 2004, note 18 supra.
29  Note 23 supra.
30  Note 9 supra. 
31  Jeffrey Owens: Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension. In: Schön W. (eds) Tax and Corporate 
Governance. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, 2008.
32  Note 5 supra.
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later would crystallize into Co-operative Compliance: A Framework – From Enhanced 
Relationship to Co-operative Compliance33. 
This means that in the tax area there are currently two leading frameworks34, TRM, 
primarily addressed at shareholders and to some extent at company stakeholders, 
and BBTCf, designed with tax authorities in mind. They vary in the number of com-
ponents (5 in TRM, 6 in BBTCf) and in their focus, because TRM is mainly concerned 
with shareholders and stakeholders, while the fTA´s BBTCf aims at providing tax 
assurance to revenue bodies. for this reason, companies should not choose one or 
the other, but rather rely on both, and in chapter 5 we explain how both frameworks 
are not rival but complementary. The table below compares its components.
Table 3 The two leading tax frameworks, TRM and BBTCF
TRM BBTCF 
Control environment
Risk assessment,
Control activities
Information and communication
Monitoring
Tax Strategy Established
Applied Comprehensively
Responsibility Assigned
Governance Documented
Testing Performed
Assurance Provided
The Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) has also de-
veloped a framework based on six Good Tax Governance Principles35. They are as 
follows: 
Table 4 The six building blocks of responsible tax behavior
A. Define and communicate a clear strategy
B. Tax must be aligned with the business and is not a profit center by itself
C. Respect the spirit of the law. Tax compliance is the norm
D. Know and manage tax risks
E. Monitor and test tax controls
f. Provide Tax Assurance
These building blocks are measured through 31 indicators, detailed in Appendix B of 
the annual VBDO report36. We will not detail these indicators here, but the reader is 
welcome to consult them as they provide an excellent resource to further understand 
how the principles of good tax governance may be implemented in practice. 
33  Note 24 supra 
34  They are not the only ones: Belastingdienst, the Dutch Tax Administration, elaborated in 2008 a Tax 
Control framework (Netherlands tax and Custom Administration, Co-ordination group on the treat-
ment of very large business, Tax Control framework, from focus on Risks to being in Control: a 
different approach March 2008, available at https://download.belastingdienst.nl/itd/beleid/overige/
tax_control_framework.pdf). New Zealand and Australia have also issued a tax control framework, 
ASNZS 4360:2004, as noted by Demidenko and MacNutt (Elena Demidenko and Patrick McNutt: The 
Ethics of Enterprise Risk Management as a Key Component of Corporate Governance. Available at https://
web.actuaries.ie/sites/default/files/erm-resources/92_ethics_ERM.pdf.pdf, 2010, pg. 3). Other authors 
have proposed their own TCfs, for example Baker and Kloosterhoff (Anuschka Bakker and Sander 
Kloosterhof: Tax Risk Management, From Risk to Opportunity. IBfD, the Netherlands. ISBN: 978-90-
8722-070-9, 2010).
35  Note 10 supra 
36  íbidem, pgs. 57-58.
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IV. Types of tax risk
for the classification of tax risks, TRM provides a very useful and widely used termi-
nology. TRM defines seven tax risk areas, four are specific while the other three are 
generic (aggregate)37. 
Table 5 Tax risk types in TRM
Specific risk areas
   1 Transactional Risk
   2 Operational risk
   3 Compliance risk
   4 financial accounting risk
Generic risk areas 
   5 Portfolio Risk
   6 Management Risk
   7 Reputational Risk 
A brief summary of the concepts of TRM is below. for a more detailed description, 
please refer to Elgood, Paroissien and Quimby38. 
Specific risk areas:
Transactional risk
Transactional risks are associated with specific, one-off transactions undertaken by a 
company. In any transaction there may be uncertainty as to how the tax law will apply 
and uncertainty arising from specific judgement calls. The more unusual the transac-
tion, the higher the risk. The highest risk will be in tax-driven restructurings.
To mitigate transactional risk, it is important to involve the Tax Department from the 
onset, to apply consistently a risk assessment framework to make judgement calls, 
to document all transactions and to monitor implementation.
Operational Risk
It concerns the underlying risks of applying the tax laws, regulations and decisions to 
the routine, every day operations of a company. To mitigate operational risk a good 
strategy is to involve closely the Tax Department in the design of business manage-
ment systems. 
Compliance Risks
Compliance risk concerns the risk of missing tax obligations related to the prepara-
tion and filing of tax returns, making payments, responding to enquiries from the tax 
authority and meeting any other statutory obligation, including third-party information 
returns. 
The way to mitigate compliance risks is to set up appropriate systems, processes 
and procedures, including for extracting information. They need to be up-to-date to 
legislation and practice.
37  The term ¨generic¨ refers to the notion that it affects several categories of the basic (or ¨specific¨) 
risks. Portfolio risk, by definition, crosses the four basic areas. Management and reputational risks 
are also cross-cutting, as they may appear in all basic or specific tax risk areas. 
38  PWC, 2004, note 18 supra, pgs. 4-8.
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Financial Accounting Risk
financial accounting risk concerns the accurate determination of tax liabilities in 
company accounts. This is important for the company and for tax directors, who in 
many jurisdictions, such as the US, the UK and Germany, may be held personally li-
able for wrongdoing.
A robust internal control framework, with adequate governance over judgements and 
assurance by an auditor are effective strategies to mitigate this kind of tax risk. 
Generic risk areas 
Portfolio risk
Portfolio risk concerns the aggregate level of risk when looking at all the transac-
tional, operational and compliance risks combined. The importance of a portfolio view 
of risks lies in that each area separately may be below the tolerance threshold but, in 
the aggregate, the cumulative risk profile may become unacceptable. 
Management risk
Management risk occurs when the various tax risks described above are not properly 
managed. The way to mitigate this risk is to document and implement policies for 
making decisions that are commensurate with the importance of the risk. Having an 
adequate skillset in the Tax Department, beginning with its head, is another strategy 
to mitigate management risk. 
Reputational risk 
Reputational risk concerns the damage to goodwill or brand value when negative in-
formation about the tax affairs of the company is released in the public domain. A 
strategy for mitigating this risk, aside from lowering the margin of tolerance for the 
tax risks described above, is to actively monitor and manage corporate reputation.
In addition, we will examine the specific tax issues that create risks more often. Ac-
cording to a recent survey39, these are:
Table 6 Top 10 activities that present the highest tax risk for companies
 1.  Transfer pricing of goods and services
 2.  Indirect taxes, including VAT, GST and Customs
 3.  Permanent establishment risk
 4.  Limitation of deductibility of financing expenses
 5.  Withholding taxes
 6.  Group charges / allocation of head office expenses
 7.  Transfer pricing of intangibles
 8.  Global workforce-related issues, including employment tax risk and social 
security tax risk 
 9.  Use of losses
10.  Transfer pricing of financial transactions
39  EY: Tax steps into the light. 2017 Tax Risk and Controversy Survey Series. 2017. https://www.ey.com/gl/
en/services/tax/ey-tax-steps-into-the-light 2017, pg. 6
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This chapter takes stock of recent developments in the ecosystem where large busi-
nesses operate and how they influence the tax positions taken by companies. 
I. a fluid business environment
A recurring source of uncertainty is the disconnect between business realities and 
legal frameworks. Tax laws are typically reactive to business innovations and the lag 
in producing rules and guidance generates uncertainty. An obvious example is the 
taxation of the digital economy, but there are many others. Global value chains, the 
gig economy and other new and emerging business models40 have put a strain on ex-
isting legal tax frameworks, both at the international and domestic levels, adding to a 
business environment already altered by the digitalization of the economy, trade and 
investment liberalization, the ease of communications and the logistics revolution. All 
these factors have contributed to internationalize business, even in the medium and 
small size segment, and cross-border operations typically aggravate tax risks. 
Technology, big data and analytics41 have transformed the way companies do busi-
ness, and since revenue authorities also make use of them, they are changing the dy-
namics of tax compliance and enforcement, further complicating the tax ecosystem. 
The rapid pace of technological evolution is challenging not only tax administrations, 
but business as well. Companies with robust data capabilities are better equipped to 
comply with tax requirements (for instance, Country-by-Country reporting) and at the 
same time are producing aggregate data that sheds light into the value drivers of the 
group, the geographical distribution of the value creation process and the main risks 
linked to it. Other companies, less strong on data capabilities or constrained by legacy 
40  The traditional Business model is decentralised. Prior to the ICT revolution, subsidiaries used to 
operate under a notable degree of autonomy, as a tight coordination was difficult to implement with 
telephone and traditional mail. Subsidiaries used to have customers and suppliers, manufacturing 
facilities, sales and distribution networks, R&D programmes, brands and products and, obviously, 
separate management. The arrival of the Internet and the logistics revolution allowed better coor-
dination and centralised management, with shared strategies, supply chains on a regional or global 
scale, global designs and brands, manufacturers producing for a global rather than a country market, 
international sales and marketing networks with customers in far away countries, centrally owned 
intellectual property and centrally managed supply-chain. The fully-fledged business of the Seventies 
and Eighties transformed in the 90s and 2000s into functionally specialised units, with centralised 
management, strategy and risk-taking. MNEs have nowadays a single set of intangibles, including 
product design, brands, customers and databases. They feature centralised manufacturing, sales and 
distribution networks and horizontal functions, such as procurement, insurance, treasury or tax for 
the whole compound. This centralised business model increases business efficiency in a globalized 
economy but also presents challenges in the tax area as it makes more difficult to identify where each 
constituent entity earns its profits.
41  Computing capacity is ever-increasing. Hardware is becoming cheaper and software is growing 
smarter. Recent advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence, coupled with the prolif-
eration of handheld devices that put advanced computing power in a purse or a pocket, are exciting 
transformations of information technology. Many fields are leveraging the data revolution, and tax is 
no exception. Understanding how to use these advances as tools to achieve an objective, however, 
remains a priority. 
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or disparate IT systems (e.g. through mergers and acquisitions)42, have weaker tools 
and less insight into the value drivers or the geographical distribution of risk. 
Similarly, tax administrations are at varying stages of building data capabilities, thus 
refining taxpayer selection and risk assessment procedures. for example, some tax 
administrations are already leveraging on CBCR data for high-level risk analysis 
while others will struggle to find any use in them and will probably see handling that 
information simply as a cost. 
Rapid advances in tax technology, in any event, facilitate upstream compliance and 
are shaping an emerging model of connected compliance that links the information 
systems of the public authority and those of business, providing real or near-to-real 
time services, a transparent and reliable environment, and a better user experience. 
Blockchain, artificial intelligence and the internet of things will surely deepen this 
trend, and business and tax administrations will have to cope with the rapidly evolv-
ing technological environment and adjust the risk control frameworks to the ever-
evolving business environment. 
II. Corporate Tax, a matter of public interest
Before the crisis of 2008, corporate taxation seldom was front-page news, but in the 
ensuing years tax became a matter of significant public interest. faced with bulging 
deficits, governments needed fresh revenue reservoirs, and they picked up on corpo-
rate tax avoidance. A particularly active year was 2012, when allegations of miscon-
duct brought Google, Amazon and Starbucks before the Public Accounts Committee 
of the UK Parliament43. In the parliamentary report, Members concluded that these 
companies were not paying their fair share and that this practice was widespread44, 
and the ensuing public outcry faced them with a massive PR problem. One of them 
even offered to pay additional tax to stop losing customers on account of the use of 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes45. 
In December of the same year, the European Union published its Action Plan to 
Strengthen the fight Against Tax Avoidance and Evasion46, and immediately after, the 
OECD took the lead, launching in July 2013 the BEPS Action Plan47. from that moment 
on, tax became a hotly debated political issue and references to tax avoidance were 
consistently included in the agendas and communiques of the G-20, raising expecta-
tions in governments, the media and the public about a shift in attitudes and behaviors 
by international business.
After 2015, with more than a hundred countries issuing BEPS legislation further to 
their membership of the Inclusive framework on BEPS Implementation48, taxpayers 
set themselves in the path to adjust to the new landscape. As a result, businesses are 
now required to pay attention and comply with an array of BEPS policies. Within large 
companies, the design, implementation and ongoing monitoring of these policies is 
the responsibility of the board. It is not unfair to say that tax strategy has moved from 
the office of the tax director to the boardroom49. 
fATCA and the Common Reporting Standards have also altered the tax ecosystem by 
forcing financial entities to supply information about foreign accounts to tax authori-
ties. While the impact of these information flows may be higher for individuals than 
42  Thomson Reuters: What to Expect in Today´s Changing Tax World. Global Compliance Report. https://tax.
thomsonreuters.com/onesource/global-compliance-report/, 2016, Pg. 6. 
43  UK Parliament: Public Accounts Committee– Nineteenth Report. HM Revenue and Customs: An-
nual Report and Accounts. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/
cmpubacc/716/71602.htm 
44  UK Parliament: Public Accounts Committee’s previous questioning of Google https://www.parliament.
uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/inquiries/
parliament-2015/corporate-tax-deals-15-16/background/ 
45  The Guardian: Starbucks to pay £20m in tax over next two years after customer revolt, 6 Dec. 2012.
46  COM (2012) 722 final.
47  OECD (2013b): Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en
48  117 countries as of August 2018. See OECD (2018): About the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. Available 
at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-about.htm.
49  Deloitte: The Global Tax Reset, summary results of the 2017 annual multinational survey, 2017. Available 
at https://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/tax/articles/beps-global-survey.html 
